Pilot phase: CAIM is under construction. Records are provisional, based on public sources, and have not yet been peer-reviewed. Feedback welcome.
Active Severe Confidence: medium

CSE assessed in its 2025 democratic threat update that the PRC likely has the ability and intent to use machine learning to produce detailed intelligence profiles of potential targets connected to democratic processes, including voters, politicians, media, public servants, and activists.

Identified: March 6, 2025 Last assessed: March 6, 2025

In the Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process: 2025 Update (TDP 2025), published March 2025, the Communications Security Establishment assessed that it is likely that the PRC has both the ability and intent to use machine learning to analyse data to produce detailed intelligence profiles of potential targets connected to democratic processes — including voters, politicians, members of the media, public servants, and activists. CSE noted that data available for such profiling includes shopping habits, health records, and browsing and social media activity obtained through open source acquisition, covert purchase, and theft.

Separately, CSE's National Cyber Threat Assessment 2025–2026 (NCTA), published October 2024, assessed that well-resourced states are very likely leveraging AI tools to help process and analyze large volumes of data they collect, and that foreign intelligence services are very likely using AI-enabled data analytics to find patterns and trends in bulk data, gain insights on individuals, and inform follow-on cyber operations.

The CSIS Public Report 2024, released June 2025, confirmed that PRC cyber threat actors had targeted members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, including multiple Canadian Members of Parliament, in 2021. The NCTA also assessed that PRC cyber threat actors have very likely stolen commercially sensitive data from Canadian firms and institutions.

CSIS issued a security alert in November 2023 warning about a Chinese talent recruitment campaign targeting federal government employees through talent recruitment and technology transfer initiatives, which could result in the misappropriation of government resources and the loss of proprietary and sensitive information.

Harms

CSE assesses that the PRC likely has both the ability and intent to use machine learning to produce detailed intelligence profiles of individuals connected to Canadian democratic processes — including voters, politicians, media, public servants, and activists — using data from shopping habits, online activity, government records, and surveillance devices.

Disproportionate SurveillancePrivacy & Data ExposureSeverePopulation

AI-generated profiles enable targeted foreign interference operations — identifying individuals susceptible to influence, generating personalized disinformation, and monitoring reactions — at a scale and precision not previously possible.

Disproportionate SurveillanceAutonomy UnderminedSeverePopulation

Evidence

3 reports

  1. Official — Canadian Centre for Cyber Security / CSE (Oct 30, 2024)

    States very likely use of AI-enabled data analytics; PRC very likely stole data from Canadian firms; PRC targeting of IPAC MPs

  2. Official — Communications Security Establishment (Mar 6, 2025)

    Assessed as likely that PRC has ability and intent to use ML to produce intelligence profiles of targets connected to democratic processes

  3. CSIS Public Report 2024 Primary source
    Official — CSIS (Jun 18, 2025)

    Confirmed PRC cyber targeting of Canadian MPs in IPAC in 2021

Record details

Policy Recommendationsassessed

Canada should develop counter-intelligence capabilities specifically designed to detect and disrupt ML-enabled foreign intelligence profiling

Communications Security Establishment (NCTA 2025-2026) (Oct 31, 2024)

Canadian research institutions should implement due diligence protocols for international research collaborations in AI and dual-use technologies

CSIS security alert (Nov 1, 2023)

Editorial Assessment assessed

CSE's assessment, framed specifically around democratic processes, identifies ML-enabled profiling as an enabling capability for foreign interference in Canada. The assessment uses "likely" — CSE's 60-74% probability threshold — reflecting genuine uncertainty about the extent and application of PRC ML capabilities to Canadian targets specifically.

Entities Involved

Related Records

Taxonomyassessed

Domain
Defence & Security
Harm type
Privacy & Data ExposureDisproportionate Surveillance
AI pathway
Use Beyond Intended Scope
Lifecycle phase
Deployment

Changelog

Changelog
VersionDateChange
v1Mar 11, 2026Initial publication

Version 1